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Commentary: Time To Hug a Bureaucrat
A. Michael Froomkin*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This panel, "Regulatory Aspects of Internet Governance," unites
three of the most serious, detail-oriented scholars of the regulation of
information technology. Indeed, the three papers in this session share a
commitment to detailed descriptions of regulatory regimes. Professor
Weiser's I and Professor Speta's2 papers concentrate on the Federal
Communication Commission's ("FCC") authority to regulate the
Internet, or at least some of the infrastructure on which the U.S. portion
of the Internet depends. Professor Kesan's 3 paper examines two
regulatory regimes, one self-regulatory (BBBOnline) and the other
perhaps unique (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers' ("ICANN") Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy ("UDRP")). The papers differ somewhat in their motivations.
The Weiser and Speta papers treat the issue of the correct scope of the
FCC's authority as an end in itself; the Kesan paper examines its cases
in hopes of making more general observations about e-commerce
regulation.
II. THE FCC AND THE INTERNET
Professors Speta and Weiser both understand that the FCC's current
strategy of regulation by platform will need to change in the face of

* Professor of Law, University of Miami. This Article expands on remarks presented at the
March 2003 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Conference, Technology and Governance:
How the Internet Has Shaped Our Conceptions of Governance and Institutions. Copyright 2003

A. Michael Froomkin, all rights reserved.
1. Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 41
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James B. Speta, FCC Authority To Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35
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proofs. Comments in the text of this Commentary refer to the final version.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

digital convergence, 4 and they propose ways to optimize it, with
particular attention to the FCC's regulation of broadband (cable
modems and DSL). Professor Speta notes that the FCC's mission
relates primarily to the Internet's physical or hardware layer, not its
logical or content layers. But sensible regulation of hardware cannot be
achieved without some thought about how people plan to use it.
Broadband regulation raises special problems because the broadband
provider enjoys a potential stranglehold over the consumer and perhaps
over part of the applications layer. Currently, there is at most only one
DSL line to a home, and perhaps also one cable connection; this is the
"last mile" problem. 5 Worse, there may be upstream bottlenecks as
well. Economic theory suggests that a market with two or fewer
providers is not likely to achieve a competitive result. Professor Speta
believes that the FCC abdicated its responsibilities by refusing to
regulate Internet service provider access to cable in the 1990s, and he
argues that it should not repeat this error for "interconnection."
Professor Weiser agrees that the interconnection problem is an area in
which regulation is appropriate.
If Professors Speta and Weiser broadly agree that the FCC should
take action, they disagree sharply as to where the FCC would get the
needed authority and more gently about the optimal regulatory style.
Professor Weiser argues that the FCC has authority under its Title I
"ancillary jurisdiction," 6 which he sees as a broad delegation from
Congress akin to the open-ended grant in the Sherman Act. 7 That the
FCC has rarely used this authority, has yet to develop a coherent theory
of it, 8 and indeed tends to treat it as a mostly minor power,9 are, in his
view, all surmountable obstacles.
This is certainly an argument with attractive features, not least that it
would not require going to Congress to amend the FCC's authority.
Professor Weiser is fair, however, and also notes the counterarguments,
two of which appear particularly formidable. First, as Professor Weiser
notes, broadband simply is not "ancillary" to the FCC's regulation of
"information platforms" in the usual sense of the word "ancillary."
4. Weiser, supra note 1, at 41; Speta, supra note 2, at 102.
5. For a discussion of "last mile" issues, see, for example, James B. Speta, Handicapping the
Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for BroadbandPlatforms, 17 YALE J.
ON REG. 39 (2000), and Phil Weiser, ParadigmChanges in Telecommunications Regulation, 71
U. COLO. L. REv. 819 (2000).
6. Weiser, supra note 1, at 54-64.

7. Id. at 51.
8. Id. at 52.
9. Id. at 53.
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Indeed, his reading is, as he admits, "untested and quite novel," 10 and
for all that it is also quite elegant. The core of his argument is that we
can contort the word "ancillary" to make it fit, a reading Professor
Weiser almost makes seem reasonable. Second, were one to adopt
Professor Weiser's interpretative strategy, there would be no obvious
stopping point. A key part of his argument thus lies in the construction
of a limiting principle. For if "ancillary" in Title I were to mean, in
practice, "anything remotely connected to telecommunications," it is
pretty clear that this construction of the statute would be flawed; for
whatever Title I is supposed to do, on no reading could it be a limitless
grant to the FCC of regulatory authority over all telecommunications.
Professor Weiser suggests that we read "ancillary" not to mean only
relatively minor things that come along with Title II jurisdiction, but
also relatively major things-like voice over IP-that threaten to
replace technologies over which the FCC currently has regulatory
12
jurisdiction. 1 1 The proposed "reasonably likely to substitute" test
would keep the FCC from reading Title I as a charter to regulate
anything with electrons and would keep it out of content regulation and
similar functions that the FCC should not attempt to perform.
Nevertheless, despite the excellence of the advocacy, it is hard to accept
that this is what Congress intended when it enacted Title I, or that the
language is sufficiently capacious for us to find it in there anyway. And
regardless of what we may think, it seems more likely than not that the
D.C. Circuit would take the narrow view of Title I-a point developed
convincingly in the Speta paper.13
Professor Speta advances a number of reasons for why granting the
FCC new jurisdiction under "a statutory default rule that would require
Internet carriers to interconnect amongst themselves and with retail
customers" 14 makes sense as a policy matter. In addition to preferring a
statutory basis for common carrier regulation, Professor Speta suggests
that having the FCC proceed in the common-law-like manner that
would follow from a series of adjudications under Professor Weiser's
suggested Title I authority is unlikely to produce the best rules. He also
suggests that it is nearly guaranteed to create a period of substantial
uncertainty. Instead, he advocates a new statute and some limited
rulemaking.
10. Id. at 60.
11. Id. at 60-62.
12. Id. at 63.
13. See Speta, supra note 2, pt. II (characterizing the FCC's Title I authority as uncertain and
detailing the D.C. Circuit's narrow reading of the FCC's Title I authority in recent cases).
14. Id. at 30.
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The case for an interconnection regulation is indeed strong, and if one
cannot shoehorn it into Title I, then Title II sounds like a reasonable
approach. Professor Speta argues that this new authority should be
quite limited, but it seems fair to ask whether the natural jurisdictional
creep of bureaucracies would not tend to extend this authority further
than he might like-and indeed whether that would really be so bad.
Indeed, Professor Speta's proposal is surprisingly modest.
He
advocates only that an Internet carrier be required "to transport or transit
IP-compliant traffic on an equal footing with the IP access service sold
to its retail customers. '"15
Not only does he specifically disclaim
regulation of unbundling and wholesaling of service, 16 but he is
"unwilling to endorse a rule that requires carriers to be neutral among
the applications carried over their networks," a refusal qualified by the
prediction that "such a rule may well prevail in practice."' 7 This is
cautious indeed, and risks opening up a world of gamesmanship for the
carriers, a result more easily avoided by taking this next step through
legislation. Current battles over instant messaging suggest that the
incentive to discriminate is somewhat stronger than Professor Speta
18
would like to believe.

III.

PRIVATE INTERNET GOVERNANCE

At the Conference on Technology and Governance in Chicago,
Professor Kesan presented a 200-plus-page paper that outlined an initial
model of e-commerce regulation influenced by the institutional
economics school, fleshed out by two case studies. It was an incredibly
ambitious paper-maybe overly ambitious-and I suggested in my
comments at the conference that it operated at too-high a level of
generality. There are, I argued in Chicago, important differences
between at least five different types of e-commerce markets. The

15. Id. at 32.
16. Id. at 35.
17. Id. at 37.
18. See, e.g., Joris Evers, Microsoft To Lock Down MSN Messenger Network: Move Will
Exclude Users of Third-party Software, INFOWORLD, at http://www.infoworld.com/
article/03108/19/HNmsnlockdownl.html (Aug. 19, 2003) (reporting Microsoft's decision to lock
out, by October 2003, both users of third-party software who also use MSN messaging and users
of older versions of the MSN software); see also Frederick E. Ellrod III & Nicholas P. Miller,
Property Rights, Federalism,and the Public Rights-of-Way, 26 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 475, 481-82
& n.18 (2003) (stating that "[a] provider that wields market power may believe that it benefits
from keeping its users in a 'walled garden' and making it difficult for them to communicate with,
or through, its competitors," and noting, "[I]t was only [after] a federal antitrust inquiry into its
instant messaging technology that America Online submitted a proposal allowing open access to
its Instant Messenger system.").
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differences among these markets, I suggested, are all the more
important in the context of an analysis of the optimal level of regulation,
since these markets tend to fail in different ways, with different
consequences for both efficiency and distributional justice. The market
for commodity goods is likely to be dominated by price competition
(and strategies to avoid it) in a way that will be foreign to the market for
non-commodity goods. Similarly, the services market will differ from
both types of goods, though it may have more in common with the noncommodity goods market since issues of information, quality, and
guarantee will predominate. A fourth market is that for markets and
institutions-the competition among market makers such as online
stock exchanges and auction sites. And of course, the market for
digitized data will be dominated by the struggle between its inherent
9
non-excludability and those who seek artificial excludability.)
Perhaps in response to that critique, in a revised (and slimmer)
version of his paper, Professor Kesan narrowed his focus to the two case
studies that I had suggested were insufficient to carry the freight of his
ambitious general theory. For that reason, my written remarks diverge
more than is customary from my comments on Professor Kesan's paper
20
delivered in Chicago.
Case studies are important work, and we need more of them. A
detailed examination of a particular set of facts can tell us much about
the specific situations they encompass. A study of the widget market
might, we hope, tell us whether or how the widget market should be
regulated. In order to generalize, however, we need some reason to
think that the widget market is broadly representative of the market for
other goods. We might be justly suspicious if a case study of the market
for hand-drawn miniatures was cited as evidence in a debate over
regulation of securities markets. Thus, in weighing the conclusions that
could be drawn from the examples of BBBOnline and ICANN's UDRP,
one has to ask how representative the two institutions featured in
Private Internet Governance are of other institutions or, even if
unrepresentative, whether either is a model that is likely to be replicated
elsewhere. I will suggest below that the answers to these questions are,
first, that the most representative features of BBBOnline as a form of
19. See J. Bradford DeLong & A. Michael Froomkin, Speculative Microeconomics for
Tomorrow's Economy, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL
INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10-13 (Brian Kahin & Hal R. Varian eds., 2000),
availableat http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/spec.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
20. And, as noted above, there is now a third version of Professor Kesan's paper that responds
to my comments in its text. I will confine to footnotes my comments to Professor Kesan's
responses.
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self-regulation are not fully appreciated in Professor Kesan's account,
and that (fortunately) ICANN's UDRP is not a representative publicprivate partnership.
Furthermore, for a case study to be really useful, it needs to be more
than an amalgamation of publicly available information 2 1-the
information needs to be digested, and that process of digestion
necessarily involves the application of academic skepticism. Professor
Kesan has tended to take official documents at their word, when, in fact,
22
the official reports are often demonstrably rose-tinted.
Before getting to the details, it seems appropriate to note another
fundamental difference that divides us, and which remains in this
version of the paper: Professor Kesan and I do not see the "Internet" in
the same way. Professor Kesan sees it as a thing apart, a space of its
own. I think that at least in the context of e-commerce regulation, this
is an unhelpful reification. For most e-commerce, there really isn't an
"Internet" in any useful sense any more than there is "telephone space";
rather, the Internet is just another quicker, better way of passing
information between machines and people. Professor Kesan, however,
sees it as something more. Noting "the growing importance" of ecommerce, Professor Kesan seeks to evaluate the claims of those whom
he says "see the Internet as an environment that needs some regulation
to improve its performance," 2 3 although he notes that "[s]ome authors
'24
note that particular Internet practices are already illegal.
Professor Kesan writes-and in this he is far from alone-that
"[s]ince its origin, the main characteristic of the Internet has been its
relatively unregulated character." 25 Whatever the truth of that claim as
regards governance of the Internet itself through technical standardsetting, 26 the claim's applicability to a discussion of commercial
activities conducted over the Internet is debatable. In theory, and to a

21. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 90.
22. For example, during its first years, ICANN constantly referred to its very controversial
decisions as consensus-based. Whether this was wishful thinking or active disinformation is
debatable, but it was surely nonsense. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of
Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 250-57 (2000); David Post, ICANN and the Consensus of the
Internet Community, at http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/icann and-the-consensus-of-the
_community.htm (Aug. 20, 1999) (disagreeing with ICANN's consensus statements and
questioning how ICANN arrived at such conclusions).
23. Kesan, supra note 3, at 89.
24. Id. at 89 n.8.

25. Id. at 88.
26. Cf A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 739, 782-96 (2003) (providing a short social and institutional
history of Internet standard-setting).
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great extent in practice, e-commerce has always been exactly as highly
regulated as ordinary commerce. Indeed, I know of no rule of terrestrial
commerce other than sales tax 2 7 that does not, in theory, apply to
equivalent electronic transactions. E-commerce may appear to be less
regulated than mundane commerce, but that is only because it allows
consumers in some markets, primarily those for services and
information goods, to choose among existing regulatory structures more
easily, to conduct regulatory arbitrage. 2 8 Even there, the choice is
among terrestrial regulatory systems rather than whether or not to have
one.
This difference is fundamentally important. On it turns the question
of whether one should consider e-commerce as sui generis, and be
grateful for any example of an e-institution in action, or whether one
feels more comfortable analogizing from other long-familiar
phenomena. The Speta and Weiser papers treat the interconnection
problem as something familiar. Private Internet Governance, unlike
Professor Kesan's previous work,2 9 tends toward the sui generis view.
A. Case Study: BBBOnline
BBBOnline is a propaganda triumph but a market and social failure.
It has garnered academic attention far in excess of its actual
importance-a Westlaw search found 145 academic articles and PLI
presentations mentioning it. In fact, however, as Professor Kesan notes,
BBBOnline is of almost no relevance in the real world, especially as
regards privacy policies. There are fewer than 800 firms in its privacy
seal program and less than 10,000 in its reliability seal program. The

27. The United States seems poised to renew the existing moratorium on sales tax collection
for Internet sales. See Grant Gross, Internet Tax MoratoriumBill Gains Support, INFOWORLD, at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/03/31/HNmoratorium-l.html (Mar. 31, 2003) (reporting
that in March 2003, more than 100 members of Congress sponsored a bill to make the five-year
moratorium permanent). In contrast, the European Union requires that a value-added tax be
collected by online sellers in business-to-business transactions of digital products and services.
Paul Meller, EU To Move on Taxing Online Sales, COMPUTERWORLD, at http://
www.computerworld.com/industrytopics/retail/story/0,10801,68264,00.html (Feb. 13, 2002).
28. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in
BORDERS

IN

CYBERSPACE:

INFORMATION

POLICY

AND

THE

GLOBAL

INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE (Brian Kahin & Charles R. Nesson eds., 1997), available at
http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
29. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking? A First Principles
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289 (2002); Jay P. Kesan
& Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You-Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can
Learn from the Privatizationsof the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name System,
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89 (2001).
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30
large majority of heavily-trafficked sites do not use either program.
Even for the websites that do participate, the rules are weak and
enforcement toothless. As for consumer participation, there is not much
of it going on. 3 1 Professor Kesan concludes from this that all would be
well if the government would "cooperat[e] in the design and
enforcement" 32 of privacy rules. Doing so will enhance the mythic
"consumer confidence" that governments like to say they are
fostering 33-as if online commerce were not increasing at a rapid pace.
In fact, the failure of BBBOnline is its most interesting and
representative feature. To begin with, as Professor Kesan notes, when it
comes to privacy rules, the strictures of BBBOnline do not bind tightly.
Even so, almost no one bothers with the fig leaf it offers. Perhaps firms
believe they do not in fact face much threat of regulation-a logical
supposition in the George W. Bush era-and hence lack much
motivation to expend resources to head off a low risk.
Assume that there is a market in which consumers believe the market
clearing level of consumer protection provided by the N identical firms
in the market is inadequate. If worried consumers are sufficiently
numerous, they may be able to persuade politically entrepreneurial
politicians to regulate the market. Assume that participants in the
market expect these regulations to have a cost C* per firm, discounted
by the probability of regulation to become C. In this world each firm
faces the following choices:
1. It can accept the expected cost C.

30. Kesan, supra note 3, at 103 & n.48 (citing Stephen R. Bergerson, E-commerce Privacy
and the Black Hole of Cyberspace, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1527, 1543 (2001)).
31. Id. at 104 ("Consumers are not participating widely in the private regulatory process.").
32. Id. at 105.
33. The FTC is a leading offender here. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, SUMMARY OF
PUBLIC WORKSHOP: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS IN
THE BORDERLESS ONLINE MARKETPLACE passim (Nov. 2000) (detailing discussions regarding
development of ADR programs that consumers can understand and appreciate), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003); Mary
Hillebrand, FTC: E-Commerce Mediations Should Replace Lawsuits, E-COMMERCE TIMES, at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/2473.html (Feb. 8, 2000) (discussing the FTC's
planned spring 2003 ADR workshop aimed at building consumer confidence through
development of ADR programs that give consumers access to fair and effective resolutions of
online marketplace problems); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases 2002 Statistics
on Cross-border Consumer Fraud (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2003/02/cbfrpt.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003) (describing Econsumer.gov "as a joint effort
involving 13 countries to gather and share cross-border e-commerce complaints in order to
respond to the challenges of multinational Internet fraud, and enhance consumer confidence in ecommerce").
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It can counter-lobby the consumers, hoping to spend some sum
less than C. Since each firm has an interest in free riding on
others' expenditures, this may not be effective. It is also risky:
politics is not yet demonstrably a simple input-output model in
which a given level of investment guarantees a given result.
It can engage in some sort of signaling tactics to reassure
consumers that their concerns are being addressed, with
ostentatious self-regulation being one such strategy. Ignoring,
for the moment, collective action problems, each firm seeks to
spend the minimum amount (or, if you prefer, provide the
minimum necessary consumer protection) to pacify enough
consumers to break up what would otherwise risk becoming a
34
winning coalition in favor of regulation.

Frequently, firms choose option three. Often this self-regulation is
little more than window-dressing. The window-dressing serves two
purposes. It allows firms to persuade the least well-informed
consumers, and those whose taste for regulation is the weakest, that
their needs are being addressed. And it gives government officials who
might otherwise feel pressured to act-whether or not regulation is in
fact justified-something to hide behind.
In this context, consider Professor Kesan's suggestion that
"[g]overnments and consumer groups view some of these private
initiatives as indications that self-regulation can be effective on the
Internet." 35 There is no question that is what the U.S. government says
when rejecting calls for increased regulation. I am not, however,
familiar with any reputable consumer group that agrees that selfregulation has been effective for online privacy issues, and none is
cited. More to the point, however, there's no reason in the abstract to
think it is likely to be true, if only for the very reasons Professor Kesan
36
summarizes in his paper.
34. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 101 (noting that the goal of private firms is to "generate a
minimum set of rules that will avoid government intervention").
35. Id. at 94.
36. Professor Kesan says he agrees that the third option above is likely, but states:
I warn off against excessive government regulation that could harm private investment
and create incentives for private firms to defect by trying to avoid government
regulation through the use of their superior technological knowledge. This is the
essence of the private-public cooperation that this Article leads to. In short, we appear
to be saying the same thing, but I hope to offer a better solution by enhancing
government participation without creating incentives for the private sector to defect.
Id. at 105-06. Well, we are all against "excessive government regulation" and for motherhood
too. But while motherhood may be easy to identify, there is considerable debate about what sort
of government regulation is "excessive." By joining the cheerleading for the sham of BBBOnline
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Professor Kesan approaches the problem dialectically, by outlining
what he says are the claimed advantages and disadvantages of selfregulation of "online privacy." 37 Proceeding in this manner allows him

to give reasons proffered by others without having to vouch for them
himself. Indeed, we see thesis and antithesis, but not much of a
synthesis other than that there's something to both sides.
The same dialectic approach guides the discussion of whether
regulation should be "top-down" or "bottom-up." No one could
disagree that "cooperation between the government and the private
sector, exploiting the advantages that each system offers" 38 is the way
to go. The problem is figuring out what that means in practice. What's
more, it turns out that regulation should not be national; rather, "it is
important to cooperate with other governments in order to converge to a
unique set of rules for the Internet."' 39 Why the Internet needs a "unique
set of rules," why a bonsai tree bought online should be regulated
differently from one bought by phoning in an order from a catalog, are
not explained. 4 ° Nor are the implications for national democracy
and the industry-designed injustice of the UDRP, Professor Kesan gives aid and comfort to those
who wish to argue that these deeply flawed models somehow demonstrate how we could do
without government intervention in the area of privacy or justice. To my eye, to the limited
extent these case studies prove anything, it is exactly the reverse: these are areas that currently
suffer from a sub-optimal level of regulation.
This government-private partnership talk is wonderful stuff, and if it leads to something
meaningful, I would be all for it, but the point of the third option above is that there is a very
substantial chance that industry is going to bail out before the self-regulation has teeth. If there
are practical strategies described in Professor Kesan's paper that would produce a substantial
reduction in the probability of this unfortunate outcome, I missed them.
37. Kesan, supra note 3, at 95-98. As noted above, I have some doubts about the utility of
trying to treat these questions across multiple markets. See supra note 19 and accompanying and
preceding text (describing the need to consider important differences in at least five types of ecommerce markets when optimizing regulation within those markets).
38. Kesan, supra note 3, at 100.
39. Id. at 100-01. I strenuously disagree with the claim that "[m]ost of the attempts to
converge to a common set of rules on the Internet have come from government initiatives." Id. at
98-99. This leaves out the essential work of voluntary-standards bodies such as the Internet
Engineering Task Force ("IETF'), W3C (World Wide Web Consortium), and many others. See
generally Froomkin, supra note 26, at 786-820 (discussing the emergence of IETF and other
voluntary bodies, as well as their regulatory strengths and weaknesses).
40. Professor Kesan objects to my example as being true "only if one thinks of just the U.S.
market and not international markets." Kesan, supra note 3, at 92. Since international telephone
calls are increasingly cheap, this cannot be a denial that international phone sales are possible.
Ultimately, it seems to be a claim that what makes the Internet different is the difficulty of
transnational enforcement. See id. at 92-93. ("[I]f you buy the bonsai tree from a firm in a
foreign country, you may have problems getting similar redress for any loss from that transaction.
In addition, jurisdictions are not well-established and the transaction costs involved are
uncertain."). We could, I suppose, spend a long time trying to find data about domestic rates of
customer dispute resolution to see if Professor Kesan's intuitions about domestic recourse are
correct. But fortunately we do not need to. Instead, one need only observe that, at least in the
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explained, even though an almost inevitable consequence of supranational regulation is the substantial diminution of voter control over
the regulations that control national markets.
B. Case Study: ICANN's UDRP
The best case for the UDRP was that a few cybersquatters were

getting undeserved windfalls by registering for domain names for free,
then selling them to trademark holders for thousands, due to the high
settlement value of even a meritless trademark case. 41 The second-best
case was that national legal systems had not figured out how to treat
domain names. 42 To
some extent both of these justifications have been
43
events.
by
overrun
Cybersquatting is down, 4 4 both because of the end of the dot.com
bubble, and because domain-name registrations now cost money up
front. At the time the UDRP was designed, there was no specific
domain-name legislation in the United States or elsewhere, although by
the time ICANN enacted the UDRP, Congress had passed the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"),4 5 which created
powerful legal remedies against cybersquatters, including up to
$100,000 in statutory damages. 46 It is important to understand,
however, that the "need" 47 for the UDRP was felt by trademark rights
holders, not the public, and that the system was designed by and for
those rights holders, with the cooperation of the World Intellectual
United States, a substantial amount of e-commerce is conducted with the use of credit cards,
which effectively act as insurers to the transaction and will refund the charge if the consumer has
a dispute with the seller. (Similar protections do not necessarily exist for debit cards and do not
exist at all for Paypal-type intermediation schemes even if the consumer pays Paypal with a credit
card.) Thus, at least for international purchases from the United States via credit card, the
customer's recourse is substantially similar wherever the seller happens to be located.
41. E.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND
ADDRESSES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES-FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET
DOMAIN
NAME
PROCESS
paras.
314-18
(Apr.
30,
1999),
available at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process l/report/finalreport.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
42. See id. paras. 131-32 (stating that the global presence of domain names and the sheer
volume of violations created multijurisdictional issues).
43. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"Causes and (Partial)Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 621-22 (2002) (describing justifications for
ICANN's UDRP).
44. See Tamara Loomis, Domain Name Disputes Decline as Internet Matures, N.Y. LAW., at
http://www.nylawyer.com/news/03/02/020603c.html (Feb. 6, 2003) (stating that "the number of
UDRP proceedings has dropped by almost half in the last two years," in part because
cybersquatting has declined as a result of the slowing Internet economy).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
46. Id. § 1117(d).
47. Kesan, supra note 3, at 106.
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Property Organization ("WIPO"). It is simply as one-sided a system as
those constituencies could get away with.4 8

Cybersquatting may be down, but it is not dead, so the first
justification-reduction of settlement costs of meritless cases-still has
some power. In the UDRP, the trains run on time, and enforcement is
swift and sure. If the plaintiff trademark holders do not get what they
want the first time, they can always try again. 49 While respondents do
have some ability to choose a panel member in a three-person panel,
they may have to pay for the privilege. 50 (Plus their choice is limited to
the arbitrators selected by the dispute resolution service providers, who
have been culling their lists of anyone who might be considered
unsound from a rights-holder's point of view. 5 1 Thus, for the
defendant, the choice of panelists verges on a Hobson's choice rather
than a real one.) I have argued elsewhere that the UDRP lacks basic
due process. 52 Professor Kesan states repeatedly that his Article does
not address due process concerns posed by the two regimes he
describes. Nevertheless, he persists in saying that the UDRP example
"showed that cooperation between the private sector and public sector is
the best outcome from the social welfare standpoint" 53 Neither the
UDRP's value as a model, nor its effect "from the social welfare

48. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 159-68 (2000) (describing due process concerns
associated with ICANN's UDRP); Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations
of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP 10-17, at http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/
geistudrp.pdf (Aug. 2001) (providing a brief overview of the UDRP's development while
analyzing alleged problems of bias, particularly regarding panel formation); Milton Mueller,
Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy 4-5, at
http://dcc.syr.edu/miscarticles/roughjustice.pdf (Nov. 2000) (detailing the development of the
UDRP). See generally Froomkin, supra note 43, at 613-49 (discussing the history prior to the
UDRP).
49. See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc. v. Parvin, WIPO Case No. D2002-0969 (2003) (Perritt, Presiding
Panelist, concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I encourage the Complainant to refile .... "),
available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0969.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2003).
50. See ICANN, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY para.
5(c), at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm#5c (Oct. 24, 1999) ("If Complainant
has elected to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel and Respondent elects a threemember Panel, Respondent shall be required to pay one-half of the applicable fee for a threemember Panel as set forth in the Provider's Supplemental Rules.").
51. Milton Mueller, arguably the leading authority on the history of ICANN and the UDRP,
was recently dropped from WIPO's list of arbitrators. WIPO informed parties that he had been
dropped but did not notify him. Although a WIPO official told me she faxed me an offer to sit as
a panelist when it opened the center, I never received it. When I applied after hearing this story, I
was rejected.
52. See Froomkin, supra note 43, at 649-51 (discussing procedural flaws of the UDRP).
53. Kesan, supra note 3, at 92.

2003]

Comment: Time To Hug a Bureaucrat

standpoint" can be divorced from its effects on basic rights. If, as I and
others have argued, the UDRP is fundamentally unjust, this has more
than a little relevance to the suitability of the process that produced the
UDRP as a model for the future and also to the value of the UDRP
itself. Many academic commentators agree that the UDRP is very, very
flawed. 54 Given that view, I cannot agree that the UDRP is "closer to
an optimal mixed system" 55 than something
fair, such as the courts, at
56
least in any useful sense of "closer."
In my opinion, Professor Kesan's account of the UDRP suffers from
naive optimism. ICANN's recent reform entrenched some factions at
the expense of the public voice. 57 Tomorrow's ICANN is not going to
"accommodate different views and be open to changes," 5 8 as the whole
59
point of the recent exercise was to stifle dissent, not embrace it.
Similarly, ICANN's interest in striking deals with governments is
simple: it hopes that the governments will pay it, and it knows that until
it makes those deals, the U.S. government will not accept that ICANN
has met the preconditions for decreased U.S. supervision of ICANN.6 °
Given the very tortured history of the campaign to block the creation of
new top-level domains-and especially to block general-purpose
ones 6 1-it is ivory-tower wishful thinking to set out how ICANN might
54. See id. at 136 & n. 63.
55. Id. at 136.
56. Professor Kesan's new conclusion, though not all his text, retreats to the view that "[t]he
UDRP system is somewhat closer to an optimal mixed system, but is nevertheless deeply
flawed." Id.
57. See Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, From Self-Governance to Public-Private Partnership:The
Changing Role of Governments in the Management of the Internet's Core Resources, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1119-20 (2003) (describing reformed ICANN as a deal between certain
industries and certain governments, which sidelines individual Internet users). See generally
David R. Johnson et al., A Commentary on the ICANN "Blueprint" for Evolution and Reform, 36
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1127 (2003) (arguing that abandoning the "consensus process" to ICANN is
not in the best interest of the Internet community).
58. Kesan, supra note 3, at 114.
59. See Johnson et al., supra note 57, at 1127 ("[A]bandoning consensus as the basis for
ICANN policy-making is neither in ICANN's best interests nor in the best interests of the Internet
community."); Kleinwaechter, supra note 57, at 1123 ("The losers of the present redistribution of
power in cyberspace are the Internet users.").
60. See NAT'L TELECOMMS. AND INFO. ADMIN. & ICANN, AMENDMENT 6 TO
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ICANN, at
http://www.icann.org/generallamend6-jpamou-17sepO3.htm (Sept. 16, 2003) (requiring ICANN,
inter alia, to "[c]ontinue its efforts to achieve stable agreements with ccTLD operators" and to
"conduct outreach to governments and local Internet communities in targeted regions").
61. See generally MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE
TAMING OF CYBERSPACE (2002) (tracing the history of control and property rights in names and
addresses on the Internet, including top-level domains); Milton Mueller & Lee McKnight, The
Post-.COM Internet: Towards Regular and Objective Procedures for Internet Governance, at
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2003/175/tprcO3-mueller-mcknight.pdf
(Aug.
1, 2003)
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create new top-level domains for free speech or any other purpose. 62 It
is not going to happen without a push of some sort from outside, and the
new structure makes that push even less likely. 63 The new reforms do
not, as Professor Kesan would have it, give users "the opportunity to
place representatives on ICANN's Board of Directors"64-on the
contrary, as he later
notes, 6 5 they remove every vestige of user influence
66
over the Board.
Professor Kesan states that the "legitimacy of [ICANN's] functions is
the basis for effectively enforcing domain-name dispute-resolution
rules ... mak[ing] the UDRP one of the most viable systems for dispute
resolution on the Internet." 6 7 Even if there were not massive doubts as
to ICANN's fundamental legitimacy, 68 no amount of underlying
legitimacy could justify a system that lacks minimum aspects of fairness
and due process. It is adding insult to injury to say that "[u]ser
participation is much higher in the UDRP than in the previous case
study of the privacy rights TPIs." 6 9 This "user participation" consists of
signing contracts of adhesion, which ICANN forbids registrars from
varying, then being subject to UDRP proceedings by covetous third
parties. That's it. There may be-"in theory" 7 0 -ways that domain(detailing opposition to new top-level domains and proposing an annual ICANN procedure to add
top-level domain names).
62. See Kesan, supra note 3, at 116-17 (describing the potential creation of new top-level
domains for speech purposes only).
63. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing ICANN's recent retrenchment at the
expense of the Internet community).
64. Kesan, supra note 3, at 117.
65. See id. at 134 (noting that "Internet users have lost their prerogative to elect At-large
members directly by popular vote").
66. See, e.g., Kleinwaechter, supra note 57, at 1123-24 (discussing the reduced role of users).
67. Kesan, supra note 3, at 112. ICANN's ability to enforce UDRP judgments in generic toplevel domain (gTLD) space is a result of its contracts with registries, which in turn rest on its
relationship with the U.S. government. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Form and Substance
in Cyberspace, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93, 93-119 (2002). Greater or lesser
participation by "the international community" has no bearing on enforcement. But see Kesan,
supra note 3, at 113-14 (noting that increased international cooperation in ICANN "will allow for
better enforcement of dispute resolution policies").
68. On ICANN's legitimacy, compare generally Weinberg, supra note 22 (arguing that
ICANN's uses of administrative law techniques, representation, and consensus have failed to
establish its legitimacy), with Dan Hunter, ICANN and the Concept of Democratic Deficit, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1149 (2003) (analyzing ICANN as a democratic institution and arguing that
democracy is an empty concept and ICANN should not be blamed for its undemocratic nature).
69. Kesan, supra note 3, at 115. Similarly, the claim that the UDRP "has provided good
competitive incentives for domain-name dispute-resolution service providers," id. at 110, makes
sense only if one considers the matter from the point of view of complainants, not defendants.
The dispute-resolution service providers compete to appear plaintiff friendly, which may not be
everyone's idea of "good competition."
70. ld. at 115.
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name registrants can influence the UDRP, but there are none in practice.
The review of the UDRP promised two years ago was first blocked by
the ICANN-appointed chair, then by his resignation. 7 1 No replacement
was named, and the Task Force was quietly shut down. 72 This is not, to
73
coin a phrase, an accident.
As regards the proper way to resolve domain-name disputes, I would
assert that ordinary courtroom litigation, with all its costs and delays, is
better than the UDRP because at least the parties are on a level playing
field and before a neutral decision maker. Of course, that does not
prove that we could not do better still. More generally, I take issue with
the claim that ICANN has had "successes." 74 Perhaps from an internal
view the "expansion of its influence all over the world" 75 is a good
thing, but shouldn't one ask if this influence is for good or ill before
branding it a success? Professor Kesan seems blinded to the ugly
realities by the glittering possibilities. Meanwhile, former ICANN
76
enthusiasts have seen the scales fall from their eyes.
I agree with Professor Kesan that the various flaws of BBBOnline
and ICANN's UDRP suggest we can do better. I do not think, though,
as an abstract matter, that these two examples tell us enough about what
that something better would look like, or that they allow much in the
way of generalization, except one: Don't do this. In particular, I do not
see how these examples alone allow us to conclude with any confidence
that a 'mixed' regime would be preferable as a general matter, as

71. A very restrained account of the problems with the UDRP Task Force appears in Ethan
Katsh's letter to Bruce Tonkin. Letter from Ethan Katsh, Professor and Director, Center for
Information Technology and Dispute Resolution, University of Massachusetts, to Bruce Tonkin,
Chair of the ICANN Generic Names Supporting Organization (Mar. 2003), available at
http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/nc-udrp/ArcO0/msg00574.html (last modified Mar. 12, 2003).
The resignation letter of the UDRP Task Force Chair, J. Scott Evans, is available at
http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/nc-udrp/ArcOO/msg00575.html.
72. The UDRP Task Force was quietly shut down at the Generic Name Supporting
Organization ("GNSO") Council meeting held April 17, 2003. See Letter from Glen deSaint
Gdry, GNSO Secretariat, to GNSO Council Members (Apr. 18, 2003) (providing draft minutes of
the
GNSO
Council
teleconference
on
April
17,
2003),
available
at
http://www.dnso.org/clubpublic/council/Arcl2/msg00250.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2003); see
also UDRP Review Process Closed, Renewed, UDRPLAW.NET, at http://www.udrplaw.net/
UDRPReview.htm (May 1, 2003) (noting with surprise that the shutdown had occurred).
73. Similarly, I disagree that, other than the idea of getting governments to pay for ICANN in
exchange for Board seats, the new ICANN structure rejected most of the Lynn plan for reform.
See Kesan, supra note 3, at 129. The final plan kept the essential ideas of the president's
"reform": more power for insiders, less for outsiders. See generally sources cited supra note 57.
74. Kesan, supra note 3, at 122.
75. Id.
76. See generally Johnson et al., supra note 57 (criticizing the abandonment of the global
consensus model).
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intuitively plausible as that conclusion may be. The examples do not
seem to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the hypothesis that perhaps
a regime of required disclosures would suffice to get a market for
privacy started. They also fail to rebut the suggestions that perhaps the
77
question of market structure is a sideshow in light of technological
78
and political developments such as Total Information Awareness.
IV. PARTIAL CONSENSUS

Although there are many differences, it is worth noting that the three
papers exhibit a basic consensus: the Internet can, should, and will be
regulated. The issue is not whether, but how. Professor Kesan's project
is focused on so-called self-regulatory efforts that might free us, at least
partially, from the traditional, somewhat bureaucratic, paradigms in
which both the Speta and Weiser papers operate. This is a noble
ambition, but if BBBOnline and the UDRP are representative examples
of either self-regulation or business-government cooperation in action,
then it is time to hug a bureaucrat.

77. Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461, 1501-38
(2000) (describing legal solutions to data privacy issues in light of technological developments).
78. See generally ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., "TERRORISM" INFORMATION AWARENESS
(TIA), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/ (last updated Sept. 10, 2003). The TIA
project is part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Information Awareness
Office. Id. The goal is to capture the "information signature" of people through computer
algorithms and human analysis so that the government can track possible terrorists and criminals.
Id.

